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Abstract
This paper proposes a nested model, based on an additive random util-
ity model, to analyze whether pension wealth and pension cost affect the
probability that a worker affiliates to a pension program, and to observe
differentiated effects regarding the nature of the pension system (pay-as-
you-go or funded). The analysis focuses on Peru because the peculiar
coexistence of a pay-as-you-go and a funded system allows observing first
whether a worker is subscribed or not, and then his choice between pay-
as-you-go and funded system. The data consists in five cross sections from
the ENAHO between 2005 and 2009. Results show that changes on costs
have a greater impact over the probability of affiliation than changes on
benefits, and that changes affect more when applied to the funded system
than when applied to the pay-as-you-go. Variables related with the con-
tracting firm have a large impact. Hence, this paper provides a tool to
evaluate measures to solve the coverage problems of pension programs.
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1 Introduction
The performance of a pension program is usually assessed by considering its
coverage, which can be defined twofold. On one hand, coverage refers to the
proportion of the elderly population protected by the program. On the other
hand, coverage refers to the proportion of young adults affiliated to the pro-
gram or, if the indicator looks to predict future protection more effectively, to
the proportion of those paying contributions to the program. This paper focuses
on coverage of young adults.
The coverage of pension programs is low in several countries, with special em-
phasis in Latin America. Rofman, Lucchetti and Ourens (2008), who collected
information on coverage based on households surveys, show that less than 40%
of the labor force made regular contributions to pension systems in eleven of the
fifteen Latin American countries considered in the mid 2000s. It is noteworthy
that low coverage is a problem that neither countries that preserved pay-as-you-
go systems nor countries that introduced funded pension systems have solved.
How would the uncovered workers finance their consumption when they retire?
Would the traditional intergenerational arrangements be enough in a context of
population aging?
There is little empirical evidence useful to increase coverage because of two
problems. First, the lack of microeconomic data on expected benefits and costs
of the pension programs has led the analysis to focus on probability models that
include many explanatory variables related to the individual (mainly, income
and age) and its labor position. This strategy does not help to improve the
design of pension programs because it does not identify whether the effect of
these variables operates through benefits, costs or other channel. Second, the
fact that Peru and Colombia are the only countries where the pay-as-you-go
and the funded systems coexist has led the literature to analyze the coverage
problem for one system or the other, but not in a comparative way.
This paper analyzes empirically whether the probability that a worker is cov-
ered by the Peruvian pension program is determined by pension wealth, pension
cost and the nature of the pension system. The analysis is conducted for Peru
because, as opposed to other countries, the pension reform of 1993 established
that a worker has the opportunity to choose between a pay-as-you-go system
and a funded system. The coexistence of these systems is unusual since a group
of reforming countries introduced a funded system by phasing out the preexist-
ing pay-as-you-go system and another group created a unified multiple pillars
system. The data consists in five cross sections of a Peruvian household survey
carried out by the Peruvian Statistics Institute between 2005 and 2009.
The first stage implies estimating pension wealth and pension cost because the
data do not provide information on them, neither in the pay-as-you-go system
nor in the funded system. Pension wealth, defined as the discounted sum of
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future benefits from retirement, is constructed for each worker in the survey
under the three possible alternatives: not subscribed to any pension system,
subscribed to the pay-as-you-go system and subscribed to the funded system.
Pension cost, defined as the discounted sum of contributions until retirement, is
computed similarly. In both cases, the analysis focuses on workers that receive
monetary income, including wage workers and self-employed workers.
The second stage proposes a nested model, based on an additive random util-
ity model, to analyze the subscription of the worker to the pension program,
observing first whether he is subscribed or not, and then his choice between
the pay-as-you-go and the funded systems. An additional model observes first
whether the worker is contributing to the pension program or not, and then
what system receives the contributions. The explanatory variables of interest
are pension wealth and pension cost, which vary over the worker and the alter-
native. A set of controls that vary over the worker are also included, such as
income, age and characteristics of the employer.
Results from both models are similar. On one hand, the affiliation model con-
firms that pension wealth has a positive impact on affiliation, while pension cost
has a negative impact. The marginal effects’ analysis reveals additional patterns.
First, a small change on pension cost has a greater impact over affiliation than
the same change on pension wealth, which holds in both the pay-as-you-go sys-
tem and the funded. Second, changes over the funded system have larger impact
over affiliation than changes over the pay-as-you-go system, which is true for
both pension wealth and pension cost. Hence, the nature of the pension system
(whether it is pay-as-you-go or funded) affects the impact of pension wealth
and cost over affiliation. On the other hand, the contribution model shows that
pension wealth does not have a significant impact on contribution, while pen-
sion cost does have a negative impact. Again, the marginal effects’ analysis
reveals that a change on pension cost has a larger impact in the funded system
than in the pay-as-you-go. Finally, a number of control variables have a signif-
icant impact over affiliation and contribution, such as income, age, as well as
self-employment, number of workers and economic sector of the contracting firm.
The literature review confirms that the analysis of pension programs does not
incorporate information on benefits and costs, and that research has focused
in each system in isolation. Holzmann, Packard y Cuesta (2000) use a cross
section for Chile and Argentina. Auerbach, Genoni y Pagés (2007) use many
cross sections for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua
and Peru. The results show that the income and age variables are significant,
but do not establish whether they affect the subscription directly or through
expected benefits or costs.
Chacaltana (2004) used three cross sections for the Peruvian case. The con-
tribution of the paper is that, in addition to a binomial model for the coverage
of the social security, he presents a multinomial model for the following al-
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ternatives: subscribed to the pay-as-you-go system, subscribed to the funded
system and not subscribed at all. Although this document does explore the dif-
ferential effects taking into account the nature of the regimes, the explanatory
variables do not include specific characteristics of the pension systems. Besides,
the author points out that the multinomial model used is not econometrically
appropriate because there is substitution between the alternatives, and he pro-
poses a nested model as a future line of research.
This paper contributes to the literature on three dimensions. First, it con-
structs variables associated with benefits and costs of pension programs, for
both pay-as-you-go and funded system. These variables allow the direct evalua-
tion of its impact over affiliation and contribution to pension programs. Second,
the paper uses the coexistence of the two systems in Peru to find differentiated
effects of changes on benefits and costs over affiliation and contribution. Fi-
nally, it provides an econometric tool to evaluate the possible impact of policy
measures to solve the low coverage of pension programs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the Peruvian regulatory
framework at the time of analysis. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical model,
modified from Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2007). Section 4 briefly presents the
database. Section 5 describes the empirical methodology. Section 6 presents the
estimation strategy and results of the construction of pension wealth and cost.
Section 7 presents the results. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Institutional framework
The Peruvian pension model consists of three independent regimes: the pay-as-
you-go system1, the funded system2 and the military and police pension system.
The first two are aimed at civilian workers from both private and public sectors,
while the latter is aimed exclusively at police and armed forces. There is a fourth
system aimed at particular groups of civil servants3, but it was closed to new
members due to severe financial problems. In short, a civilian worker currently
has the pay-as-you-go system and the funded system available for membership.
The pay-as-you-go system provides benefits set through a legal formula that
yields pensions proportional to an average of final salaries. It includes minimum
and maximum pensions, which had the purpose of introducing income redistri-
bution. This system is managed by a public office attached to the Ministry
of Economics and Finance. Despite a series of modifications on its parameters
(age of retirement, minimum contribution period, contribution rate, etc.) this
1Created by Law Decree N◦19990.
2Created by Supreme Decree N◦054-97-EF.
3Created by Law Decree N◦20530.
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regime is in financial deficit4.
The funded system was introduced in 1993 as part of a structural reform. Peru
was the second country to privatize social security, a reform conducted by 28
countries in the last years. The funded system provides benefits based on the
contributions made by the worker along its individual career, so that pensions
are the result of individual saving and the return on those savings. This system
does not have a redistribution purpose. It is managed by private pension funds
administrators under the supervision of a public agency.
The coexistence of the pay-as-you-go and the funded systems is an almost
unique characteristic of the Peruvian pension model. Mesa-Lago (2002) di-
vides the structural pension reforms implemented on Latin-American on three
groups: 1) substitution model, which involves the closure of the pre-existing
pay-as-you-go system and the opening of a fully funded system (Chile, Bolivia,
El Salvador, Mexico); 2) mixed model, which introduces a funded pillar within
the pre-existing pay-as-you-go system (Argentina and Uruguay); and 3) parallel
model, which maintains the pay-as-you-go system and introduces the funded
system as an alternative (Peru and Colombia).
Membership to pension systems is legally compulsory for wage employees and
voluntary for self-employed workers. For a wage worker, the employer is required
to withhold pension contribution from his wage and pay this amount to the pay-
as-you-go system or to the funded system, accordingly. For a self-employee, he
must report the contribution that corresponds to his wage and pay this amount
to the corresponding system.
What are the affiliation and transfer rules between systems? Newcomers in
the labor force are able to choose between the pay-as-you-go and funded sys-
tem, while individuals in the labor force at the time of reform were allowed to
stay in the pay-as-you-go system and to switch to the funded system. Indi-
viduals switching from the pay-as-you-go to the funded system are entitled to
recognition bonds if they have made a minimum number of past contributions,
which increases their future pensions. The return from the funded system to
the pay-as-you-go system is allowed only for special cases specifically included
in the legal framework, such as workers affiliated without their explicit consent
or workers that had fulfilled the requirements for a pay-as-you-go pension at the
time of their affiliation to the funded system.
The costs applicable to the members of both systems are similar. The pay-
as-you-go system applies a rate of 13% to wage. The funded system applies a
contribution rate to the pension fund equal to 10% of wage (however, succes-
sive laws set the contribution rate at 8% from 1997 to 2005). Additionally, the
4For detailed information on the financial situation of the pay-as-you-go system, see the
final report of the public technical committee established by Law N◦28991.
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funded system applies a commission rate for the pension funds administrator
and an insurance premium rate that covers the risks of death and disability.
These two rates are freely determined by each institution. The sum of the rates
is, in all cases, somewhat lower than 13%.
Retirement age is 65 in both systems and the mechanisms of pension bene-
fits computation within the pay-as-you-go and funded systems are explained in
detail in the next sections.
The calculation of the pensions is different in each system. In the pay-as-you-go,
pensions are calculated using a legal formula and require a minimum of 20 years
of contributions. In the funded system, pensions are calculated as a direct func-
tion of the accumulated resources in an individual account during the working
life and do not require a minimum number of years of contributions. Appendix
A explains in detail the computation of pensions within systems.
3 Theoretical Framework
This model departs from Galiani and Weinschelbaum (2007). They develop a
model that, as opposed to the pre-existing literature, includes worker’s decisions
as a determinant of the formality level of the economy, where formality is defined
as the right to exercise health insurance as a socially mandated benefit. This
model defines formality as the right to exercise retirement pensions and allows
two coexisting pension systems. Hence, the model helps observing the determi-
nants of the formality level of the economy and the size of the pay-as-you-go
and the funded systems, including pension benefits and costs of each system.
The model assumes that there are four types of agents: firms, workers, gov-
ernment and pension funds administrator. Firms, heterogeneous in their man-
agerial ability, maximize profits by choosing between formality and informality,
and by hiring labor. Workers, heterogeneous in their human capital endow-
ment, maximize utility by choosing whether to work in the formal or informal
sector. If they work in the formal sector, they also have to choose between the
pay-as-you-go and the funded system. The government collects payroll taxes,
provides pensions based on the pay-as-you-go system and discourage informal
activities. The pension funds administrator collects contributions and provides
pensions based on the funded system. The behavior of the former two agents is
not modeled.
3.1 Firms
The framework of the firms corresponds exactly to the original model. Firms
produce a homogenous good using managerial ability (a) and homogenous units
of labor (l). Firms differ according to an innate managerial ability, which is
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distributed according to the density function g(a) in the R+ support.
Each firm takes two decisions: the number of units of labor hired and the
market where they operate. On one hand, if a firm opts for the formal market,
the profit function is given by:
pif (l) = pf(a, l)− wf l(1 + t)− τ (6)
Where p is the price, f(a, l) is the production function, wf is the wage per unit
of labor paid in the formal market, t is the tax levied on firms5 and τ is the fixed
cost of operating formally. On the other hand, if a firm opts for the informal
market, the expected profit function is:
pii(l) = [pf(a, l)− wil] ∗ (1− q) (7)
Where wi represents the wage per unit of labor paid in the informal market and
q represents the probability that the government detect the informal firm, in
which case the firm loses profits.
The model assumes that the homogeneous good is sold in a competitive market
and that, for simplicity, its price is equal to one. In the same way, the labor
market is assumed to be competitive. Finally, the production function is Cobb-
Douglas with constant returns to scale: f(a, l) = aβl1−β
Firms maxime profit by choosing the quantity of labor demanded. A firm with
managerial ability a has the following demand functions, as operating formally
or informally:
lf = a
(
1− β
wf (1 + t)
)1/β
(8)
li = a
(
1− β
wi
)1/β
(9)
Note that both derived demand functions are linear in managerial ability.
The profit functions
∏
f (a) y
∏
i(a) can be easily obtained inserting the de-
mand functions (8) and (9) in the equations (6) and (7), respectively. Figure 1
shows how the functions depend on the inherent managerial ability.
5In Peru, this tax finances, for instance, unemployment and health insurances.
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Figure 1: Profits as a function of managerial ability
The fixed cost τ of formality determines that firms with less managerial ability
find more profitable to operate in the informal sector. To the extent that a firm
has more managerial ability, the profits of operating formally increase relative
to the profits of operating informally if the condition dΠf (a)da >
dΠi(a)
da holds,
which means: [
1
wf (1 + t)
] 1−β
β
> (1− q)
(
1
wi
) 1−β
β
(10)
The condition (10) is necessary for the existence of the formal and the informal
sector, as it is observed.
From the equality Πi(a¯) = Πf (a¯), is possible to implicitly define the critical
point a that determines two groups: 1) the firms with managerial ability a < a ,
which informally operate, and 2) the firms with managerial ability a > a, which
formally operate.
The total labor demand is composed of the formal market demand and the
informal market demand, according to the following expression:
Ld(wf , wi) = lfd (wf , wi) + l
i
d(wf , wi)
where:
lfd (wf , wi) =
∫ ∞
a¯
a
(
1− β
wf (1 + t)
)1/β
· g(a)da
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lid(wf , wi) =
∫ a¯
0
a
(
1− β
wi
)1/β
· g(a)da
3.2 Workers
Workers are endowed with units of homogeneous labor (l), which are distributed
by the density function h(l) in the R+ support. In order to consider social pro-
tection against old age, the original model is converted to a two-period model.
In the first period, the worker has to adopt a unique decision: whether to sell
the units of labor to a formal firm or to an informal firm. However, if he decides
to sell to a formal firm, the employee must further decide whether to affiliate
to the pay-as-you-go system or to the funded system. In the second period, the
worker in the formal sector receives a pension according to the chosen system
and the worker in the informal sector does not receive any pension.
The utility function of a formal worker who opts for the pay-as-you-go system
is:
upayg(l) = wf l(1− tpayg)− γ + bpayg1 + ρ (11)
Where wf is the wage per unit of labor, l is the total assigned and sold units
of labor, tpayg is the contribution to the pay-as-you-go system, γ is the fixed
cost for working in the formal sector, bpayg is the pension provided by the
pay-as-you-go system in the second period and ρ is the intertemporal discount
rate. According to the nature of the pay-as-you-go system, the future pension
is assumed to be constant and financed by contributions collected from young
workers in the second period.
The utility function of a formal employee who chooses the funded system is:
ufunded(l) = wf l(1− tfunded)− γ + bfunded1 + ρ (12)
where:
bfunded = (1 + r)tfundedwf l
where tfunded denotes the rate of contribution to the pension fund and bfunded
represents the pension received. Note that, according to the nature of the
funded system, this pension is equal to the contribution made in the first period
multiplied by the return rate r offered by the pension funds administrator6.
Finally, the expected utility of a worker who chooses the informal sector is:
6For simplicity, it is assumed that the return rate is risk free, i.e. not random.
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ui(l) = wil(1− q) (13)
where wi represents the wages per unit of labor in the informal sector and q
represents again the probability that the government detects the informal firm,
in which case the firm closes and the worker does not receive any payment7.
Obviously, the worker chooses the alternative that means getting the highest
utility. Figure 2 shows how the utility functions given by (11), (12) and (13)
depend on the number of units of labor innate to each worker. The present
value of the pay-as-you-go pension is assumed to be smaller than the fixed
cost associated to formality, i.e., bpayg1+ρ < γ. In this framework, since clearly
dupayg(l)
dl <
dufunded(l)
dl , it is possible to have workers spread over the three al-
ternatives only if dui(l)dl is smaller than a certain critical value. This critical
value is equal to the slope of the ray joining the origin to the intersection where
upayg(l) = ufunded(l). It can be shown that this condition is equivalent to the
following expression:
dui
dl
<
dupayg(l)
dl
+wf tfunded(1+r)
(
1
1 + ρ −
γ
bpayg
)
+wf (tpayg−tfunded)
(
1− γ(1 + ρ)
bpayg
)
(14)
Condition (14) is necessary to allow the formal and the informal sectors to co-
exist, as well as the pay-as-you-go and the funded systems. Intuitively, if the
payroll tax of the pay-as-you-go system is bigger or equal to the rate of con-
tribution of the funded system, condition (14) can be interpreted as follows:
a labor market with a funded system would demand a parallel pay-as-you-go
system if, for example, the pension in this system (bpayg) is high enough, or if
the fixed cost associated with working in the formal sector (γ) is low enough.
7The model excludes alternative mechanisms to the pension systems to finance retirement.
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Figure 2: Utility as a function of the labor units
The fixed cost associated with formality determines that workers with a low
endowment of labor find more profitable the informal market. To the extent
that labor endowment increases, the utility of working formally rises in both
systems. However, the marginal utility is greater in the funded system than
in the pay-as-you-go system because more labor in the former system not only
allows a higher salary in the first period, but also a higher pension in the second
period.
From the equalities ui(l¯1) = upayg(l¯1) and ui(l¯2) = ufunded(l¯2), it is possi-
ble to explicitly define two critical points l¯1 and l¯2 that determine three groups:
1) workers with labor endowment l < l¯1, who work informally; 2) workers with
labor endowment l¯1 < l < l¯2, who work formally and choose the pay-as-you-go
system; and 3) the workers with labor endowment l > l¯2, who work formally
and choose the funded system.
The listed critical values correspond to the following expressions:
l¯1 =
γ − bpayg1+ρ
wf (1− tpayg)− wi(1− q) (15)
l¯2 =
bpayg
wf (1 + r)tfunded + wf (1 + ρ)(tpayg − tfunded)
This analysis, as previously noted, assumes that the time-discounted pay-as-
you-go pension is smaller than the fixed cost associated to formality. Assuming
otherwise, it is possible to have workers spread over the three alternatives only
if dui(l)dl is smaller than the aforementioned critical value, i.e., if and only if the
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condition given by (14) holds. This case will not be discussed in this paper 8.
The total labor supply consists of the formal sector supply and the informal
sector supply, according to the following expression:
Ls(wf , wi) = lfs (wf , wi) + lis(wf , wi) = Ls
where:
lfs (wf , wi) =
∫ l¯2
l¯1
lf(l)dl +
∫ ∞
l¯2
lf(l)dl
lis(wf , wi) =
∫ l¯1
0
lf(l)dl
Since labor is inelastically offered (the individual does not choose how much
to work, only in which sector), wages do not determine the total number of
supplied hours, but only the composition between formal and informal sectors.
3.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a
[
wf , wi, l
f
s , l
i
s, l
f
d , l
i
d
]
vector such that there is a market clear-
ing in both the formal and informal sectors:
lfs (wf , wi) = l
f
d (wf , wi) (17)
lis(wf , wi) = lid(wf , wi) (18)
The analysis is restricted to equilibriums where, according to reality, formal and
informal markets exist, so as the pay-as-you-go and the funded systems. Hence,
wages are assumed to fulfill conditions (10) y (14).
In order to provide a graphical representation of equilibrium, we first draw
the locus of wages wf (wi) where the total labor demand is equal to the total
labor supply, that is Ld(wf , wi) = Ls. As it can be shown by deriving this
equality with respect to wt, the curve wf (wi) is downward-sloping as long as
the derivative of the total demand function with respect to each wage is negative.
The graphical representation of equilibrium is completed by drawing the wage
pairs wf (wi) where labor demand and labor supply are equal within each sector
of the economy. If equations (17) and (18) are derived with respect to wi, the
following expressions can be obtained for the formal and the informal sector,
respectively:
8The interest of this case in only theorical since it implies that individuals with less labor
endowment do not choose the informal market but the pay-as-you-go system, which is not
observed empirically.
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dwf
dwi
= −
∂lfs (wf ,wi)
∂wi
− ∂l
f
d
(wf ,wi)
∂wi
∂lfs (wf ,wi)
∂wf
− ∂l
f
d
(wf ,wi)
∂wf
(19)
dwf
dwi
= −
∂lis(wf ,wi)
∂wi
− ∂lid(wf ,wi)∂wi
∂lis(wf ,wi)
∂wf
− ∂lid(wf ,wi)∂wf
(20)
Although it is easy to conclude analytically that both derivatives are posi-
tive, determine further which one is bigger requires two additional observations.
First, given that total labor supply is inelastic, changes in wages only generate
migration from one market to another, that is:
∂lfs (wf , wi)
∂wf
= −∂l
i
s(wf , wi)
∂wf
∂lfs (wf , wi)
∂wi
= −∂l
i
s(wf , wi)
∂wi
Second, since total labor demand is assumed negative with respect to wages, a
wage increase in one market implies a decrease in labor demand in that market
that exceeds the increase in labor demand in the other market. Specifically:
−∂l
f
d (wf , wi)
∂wf
>
∂lid(wf , wi)
∂wf
∂lfd (wf , wi)
∂wi
< −∂l
i
d(wf , wi)
∂wi
The two previous observations allow to conclude analytically that the derivative
described in (19) is smaller than the derivative described in (20), i.e., that the
equilibrium combinations of the formal market is less downward-sloping than
the equilibrium combinations of the informal market. Hence, the representation
of the equilibrium of this economy is given by Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium wages in the formal and informal markets
The model formally identifies a number of factors that affect coverage of pen-
sion programs, as well as the choice between the pay-as-you-go and the funded
system. Productivity of workers, which is directly related with their wages,
ensures a minimum income to face the costs of formality, but also increases
contributions to pension systems and raises pension levels. Since these changes
have effects of different sign over the probability of being formal, an empirical
model on coverage should simultaneously include income, pension wealth and
pension cost. Another identified factor is managerial ability of firms, which
is directly related with the number of hired workers, because allows affording
the fixed and variable costs of formality. Finally, the probability that a firm
is caught operating informally also affects formal hiring. Hence, an empirical
model on coverage has to account for all these effects.
4 Database
Microdata used in this study consists in five cross sections of a Peruvian house-
hold survey called "‘Encuesta Nacional de Hogares" (National Household Survey,
ENAHO), carried out by the Peruvian Statistics Institute (INEI) since 1997, of
which we have used databases from 2005 to 2009.This survey, applied through-
out the Peruvian territory, has approximately 400 questions on demography;
family income and family spend; wealth and education of their members, hous-
ing characteristics, social programs access, among other variables.
The ENAHO includes two questions on pension systems, applicable to em-
ployed and unemployed individuals: 1) pension system of which is affiliated,
and 2) last month and year of contribution. These questions where included
in the questionnaire of the ENAHO since July 2004, which explains why this
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paper considers surveys only from year 20059.
The ENAHO has an annual sample size equal to twenty thousand households
and allows obtaining estimations for different levels of inference that reach the
24 departments of Peru, each one as a domain study. The methodology of esti-
mation to process the data of the ENAHO involves the use of a weighting factor
for each register.
The unit of analysis in this study is the individual of the labor force, occu-
pied and paid, with age between 25 and 65 and residents of urban areas of Peru.
The analysis excludes workers that receive only non-monetary compensations
because the design of pension systems assumes the receipt of monetary income10.
The lower limit of 25 years is established because, as explained below, the con-
struction of the pension wealth variable requires assuming that the educational
level does not change across time. The upper limit of 65 years is introduced
because the analysis is oriented to active workers, but not to the retired ones.
Residents of rural areas are excluded because their economic activities are infor-
mal and oriented to the self consumption. Hence, social security has historically
excluded them or has reached them with social assistance programs. Finally,
the analysis excludes the members of the military and police pension system
and the members of the special system aimed at particular groups of civil ser-
vants because the affiliation to these systems has a different nature from the
pay-as-you-go pension system and to the funded pension system.
The resulting database for the five years of observation contains information
for 79.717 individuals, which 21.664 claim to be affiliated to the funded system,
6.984 to the pay-as-you-go system and 51.069 unaffiliated. The section 7.1.1
will show the descriptive statistics about these groups.
5 General methodology
5.1 Additive random utility model
An Additive Random Utility Model (ARUM) for pension status is described,
based on the theoretical model described in section 3. This theoretical model
consideres that a worker has a utility level associated to deterministic factors for
each of the following three situations: unaffiliated to a pension system, affiliated
to the pay-as-you-go system and affiliated to the funded system. The proposed
ARUM adds an unobserved random component to each utility, with mean zero
9Questionnaires of the ENAHO from 1999 to June 2004 asked if the individual was affiliated
to any pension system (without specifying to what system) and under what labor condition
was affiliated (salaried or independent). The ENAHO of 1999 and 2000 additionally asked
the pension funds administrator to which he was affiliated.
10The problems of the unemployed (job placement, outplacement, lack of income) corre-
spond to other social programs.
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and variance equal to one, such that the equations (11), (12) and (13) can be
reexpressed as:
upayg(l) = wf l(1− tpayg)− γ + bpayg1 + ρ + payg (11
′)
ufunded(l) = wf l(1− tfunded)− γ + bfunded1 + ρ + funded (12
′)
ui(l) = wil(1− q) + i (13′)
The structural model of interest is characterized by equations (11′), (12′) and
(13′). Recall that wages of the formal and informal sector, represented by vari-
ables wf and wi respectively, come from equalizing labor demand and labor
supply in the formal and informal sectors. Hence, the parameters that charac-
terized the profit-maximization of firms (benefits and pension costs, detection
probability, taxes to the employer, fixed cost of operating formally, etc.) are
found in the above equations through the equilibrium wage.
The empirical analysis is performed on a simplified structural model, assum-
ing linear relationships between the utility levels and the variables considered.
Let index t ∈ [1, n] denote the worker and index j ∈ {1, 2, 3} denote the alterna-
tive as: unaffiliated to a pension system, affiliated to the pay-as-you-go system
and affiliated to the funded system.
ut,1(l) = vt,1 + t,1 (21)
ut,2(l) = vt,2 + t,2 (22)
ut,3(l) = vt,3 + t,3 (23)
The deterministic model is given by vt,j = x′t,jβ + z′tδj , where xt,j are the set
of variables that change with the worker and the specific alternative, while zt
are the set fo variables that change only with the worker. The subsection 5.2
presents the explanatory variables.
The empirical model implies observing the dependent variable yt = j if that
alternative has the bigger utility. Hence, the probability for a worker t to be in
alternative j, conditional to the explanatory variables xt,j and zt, is:
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Pij = Pr(yt = j)
= Pr(ut,j ≥ ut,k) for all k
= Pr(ut,k − ut,j ≤ 0) for all k
= Pr(t,k − t,j ≤ vt,j − vt,k) for all k
The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. The density function for worker
t is:
f(yt) = pyt,1t,1 ∗ pyt,2t,2 ∗ pyt,3t,3 (24)
where yt,1, yt,2, yt,3 are indicator variables with yt,1 = 1 if yt = j and yt,1 = 0
otherwise. That is, for each worker only one variable of the set yt,1, yt,2, yt,3 is
equal to one.
The maximum likelihood function for a sample of n observations is the product
of n densities, so that L =
∏n
t=1
∏3
j=1 p
yt,j
t,j . The maximum likelihood estimator[
βˆ, δˆj
]
maximizes the logarithm of the maximum likelihood function:
lnL(β, δj) =
n∑
t=1
3∑
j=1
yt,j .lnFj(xt,j , zt, β, δj) (25)
The estimation is based on a nested model. This model requires specifying
the nesting structure that separates the alternatives in groups, where the errors
of the ARUM model are correlated within groups, but not between groups. The
proposed model considers a tree where the first level is to be affiliated to a pen-
sion system or not to be, while the second level (applied only for affiliates) is to
be affiliate to the pay-as-you-go or to the funded systems.
The first advantage of the nested model is that assumes that there is an elas-
ticity of substitution estimable between the pension alternatives, which differs
from the elasticity between the choice of affiliating or not. This exceeds the
multinomial and conditional logit models, which must assume that the distur-
bances are independent and identically distributed. Chacaltana (2004) says
that in the Peruvian pension context the multinomial model "do not consider
the overwhelming evidence that in the last decade there has been a huge process
of transfering people from one system to another. That is, there is substitution
between alternatives in pension system". This author proposes as a future line
of research using nested logit model with the same structure as used herein.
The second advantage of the nested model is that includes not only variables
that change with the worker, but also variables that change within workers and
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specific alternatives. This paper specifically seeks to build variables associated
benefits and costs for each worker under the three possible alternatives: affili-
ated to a pay-as-you-go system, affiliated to a funded system and unaffiliated.
5.2 Dependent and explanatory variables
A model for affiliation and a model for contribution are estimated, where the
difference relies on the dependent variable. The affiliation model uses a cate-
gorical dependent variable where each worker can be whether not subscribed to
any pension system, subscribed to the pay-as-you-go system or subscribed to
the funded system. The contribution model uses a categorical dependent vari-
able where each worker can be whether not contributing to any pension system,
contributing to the pay-as-you-go system or contributing to the funded system.
The explanatory variables were selected according to the model proposed in
section 3. This allowed the identification of determinants of worker’s pension
status, some related to pension systems (benefits and pension costs), other re-
lated with the contracting firm (managerial ability, probability of informality
detection and costs associated to productivity), and other associated to workers
(productivity).
The explanatory variables of interest are those directly related to the pension
systems: pension wealth, defined as the present value of expected retirement
benefits, and pension costs, defined as the present value of the expected future
contributions until retirement. These variables, whose construction is explained
in detail in Appendix B, change with the individual and the alternative. There
are three estimations for pension wealth: one assuming that he is not affiliated
to any pension system (i.e., zero), other assuming that he is affiliated to the
pay-as-you-go and the last one assuming his affiliation to the funded system.
Similarly, each worker has an estimated pension cost in three possible scenarios.
A first set of control variables seeks to capture microeconomic determinants
not incorporated in the simple theoretical model. It includes the logarithm
of labor income, age, age squared, years of education, gender and a
dummy variable if the worker lives in Lima. Previous literature has income
as the main explanatory variable because it determines pension wealth. The
theoretical model of section 3, however, explained that productivity of workers
has three roles: 1) ensures a minimum income to overcome the costs of formal-
ity; 2) increases the contributions to pension systems and 3) raises the level
of pensions. Hence, this paper directly introduces pension wealth and pension
cost, while income and age only control for additional effects. Dumies for occu-
pational groups are also included.
A second set of control variables is related to the employer. Number of work-
ers of the contracting firm should be decisive since the theoretical model con-
cludes that it has a direct relationship with its managerial ability. Hence, an
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employee of a large firm should be more likely to be affiliated to a pension
system than an employee of a small firm. Sector of economic activity of
the contracting firm is also included using dummies. Each economic sector has
different level of technology and faces different detection probability, elements
present in the theoretical model. For example, a mining company is capital
intensive and has a higher probability of being detected if informal, than a ser-
vices company. For the same reasons, a dummy for the worker’s employment
status (salaried/independent) is included.
The last group of control variables are dummies for each year of analysis. It seeks
to control a possible trend in the worker’s behavior that responds to macroeco-
nomic factors, consists of dummies for each .
Table 1 provides information on the units of measurement of the explanatory
variables.
Table 1: Characteristics of the explanatory variables
6 Pension wealth and pension cost
This section presents descriptive statistics for the constructed pension wealth
and cost variables, whose construction is explained in detail in Appendix B.
Figure 4 shows the estimated pensions if workers were affiliated to the pay-as-
you-go system and to the funded system11. The left panel shows the average
11Note that, to facilitate the presentation, the analysis corresponds to the pension estimated,
not to the pension wealth variable.
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estimated pension in both systems by income quintiles. Pension in the pay-
as-you-go system is relatively stable to different levels of income, consistently
with its redistributive nature. Pension in the funded system is a direct function
of income, which is consistent with its capitalization nature. The right panel
presents the average estimated pension in both systems by age. Pension in
the pay-as-you-go system is again relatively stable to different levels of income,
while pension in the funded system has a negative relation with the age because
the investment horizon of young individuals allows a larger capitalization.
Figure 4: Estimated pension
Figure 4 gives preliminary information about worker’s preferences on pension
systems by age and income. Note that, without control variables, pay-as-you-go
pension wealth dominates funded pension wealth in the first income quintile;
dominance is reversed from the third income quintile and increases in the next
quintiles. Similarly, again without controlling, funded pension wealth dominates
pay-as-you-go pension wealth until 55 years, but the situation is opposite for the
workers older than 56 years. In short, older workers with low income would pre-
fer the pay-as-you-go system and the younger workers with high income would
prefer the funded system.
Figure 5 contrasts average pension cost in the pay-as-you-go and in funded
system, again by age and income. Since the contribution rate is always smaller
in the funded system than the pay-as-you-go, the cost of the first system is
smaller than the cost of the second system in all cases. The first panel shows
that, given that contributions are calculated as a rate over wage, obviously exist
a direct relation. The second panel reveals that cost decreases with the worker’s
age, given that it has been calculated as a present value.
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Figure 5: Average of the pension cost
7 Results
7.1 Affiliation model
7.1.1 Descriptive statistics
This section presents descriptive statistics of the three identified groups: af-
filiated to the pay-as-you-go system, to the funded system and not affiliated.
Weights available in the ENAHO have been used.
Figure 6 shows how the participation of the three identified groups evolves dur-
ing the period of analysis. The left panel shows that the percentage of affiliates
to the pay-as-you-go system has increased from 7% in 2005 to 12% in 2009 and
the percentage of affiliates to the funded system has increased from 23% in 2005
to 31% in 2009, which has determined the decrease of the non-affiliated workers
from 70% to 58%. The right panel excludes the non-affiliated workers. The per-
centage of affiliates to the pay-as-you-go system, contrary to what is expected
of a system with a financial deficit, increased from 25% in 2005 to 27% in 2009.
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Figure 6: Occupied individuals by previsional status
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for pension wealth and pension cost for
the three identified groups. On one hand, the first row shows that the average
pension wealth obtained by affiliating to the pay-as-you-go is bigger for workers
affiliated to the pay-as-you-go system (54.43 thousand monetary units) than for
workers affiliated to the funded system (46.35 thousand monetary units). The
second row shows that the average pension wealth generated by affiliating to
the funded system is bigger for workers of the funded system (106.66 thousand
monetary units) than for workers of the pay-as-you-go (81.27 thousand mone-
tary units). On the other hand, these patterns do not exist for pension cost.
This variable is always bigger for workers affiliated to the funded system because
they have the highest income level and the lowest age.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for the pension wealth and pension cost
variables
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the control variables, which are also
consistent with the conclusions of the theoretical model. On first place, the
model concluded that firms with low managerial ability find more profitable
operating informally and that there was a direct relation between managerial
ability and the number of hired workers. Table 4 shows that only 6,4% of the
non-affiliated employees work in firms that have more than 100 workers, while
the 42,1% of the workers of the pay-as-you-go system work in firms that have
more than 100 workers and the 53,9% of the workers of the funded system work
in firms that have more than 100 workers. On second place, the model con-
cludes that the greater productivity, the worker could be unaffiliated, affiliated
to the pay-as-you-go or affiliated to the funded system, in that order (see Figue
2). Table 4 shows that the average income of the unaffiliated workers is 646
monetary units, while the average for pay-as-you-go workers is 1016 monetary
units and the average of funded workers is 1319 monetary units. Similarly, the
average of years of education of the unaffiliated workers, the workers affiliated
to the pay-as-you-go system and the ones affiliated to the funded system is 9.5,
12.41 and 13.11, respectively.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables
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7.1.2 Econometric results
The first column of Table 4 presents a multinomial logit that can be compared
with previous literature, which relied on income and age to recover the effect
of pension wealth and pension cost on coverage. The second column presents a
conditional logit, which includes pension wealth and pension cost, but assumes
that the perturbations t,1, t,2, t,3 are independent. The third column presents
a slight variation of the previous model: a conditional logit model with fixed
effects per worker. The fourth column presents the estimation of the proposed
nested model, which is considered more appropriated because it includes pen-
sion wealth and pension cost variables and it allows dependent disturbances.
The interpretation of the results exclusively focuses on this nested model.
The coefficients related to the pension wealth and pension cost are highly sig-
nificant and have the correct signs. The positive sign of pension wealth means
that, if the variable is increased for any of the three options considered, then
this option is more likely to be selected by workers. The negative sign of pen-
sion cost means that, if the variable is increased for any of the three options
considered, then this option is less selected by workers. It is noteworthy that
the coefficients of pension wealth and pension cost have opposite signs despite
of their positive correlation (0.69)12.
12Although the correlation does not have a level that can generate collinearity, as a pre-
caution other models have been estimated by subsampling. No volatility was observed in the
estimates.
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Table 4: Estimation of the nested model
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The individual characteristics have been included as controls. Affiliation
strongly increases with the income, the age and the education of a worker.
Notice that, given that pension wealth and pension cost are included, the co-
efficients of these variables recover effects not related with pension systems.
Additionally, women tend to contribute less than males. Finally, occupational
group plays an important role. For instance, relatively to the probability of
being unaffiliated to any pension system, a white-collar worker has a higher
probability than a blue-collar worker of being both in pay-as-you-go and funded
system.
Job characteristics are also important in determining affiliation probability. On
first place, variables related to the economic sectors are important. Coefficients
for each sector (with the exception of trade) are significant, showing that the
characteristics of the contracting firm affect pension status, as the theoretical
model concluded. On second place, the size of the firm has a significant and
positive coefficient in the pay-as-you-go category and in the funded category.
This confirms that firms with little managerial ability find more profitable op-
erating informally. Finally, while the regulatory framework in Peru establishes
that membership to the pension program is compulsory for wage workers and
voluntary for self-employed workers, results confim that the variable for employ-
ment status is statistically significant in the funded category. However, it is not
significant in the pay-as-you-go category.
Finally, it should be noted that the nested model, besides its conceptual ad-
vantages, has better statistical indicators. Based on the information criterion
(AIC and BIC), which prefers lower values, the best model is the nested model.
Using as the test of maximum likelihood ratio, also the nested model is the best.
7.1.3 Average marginal effects
Table 5 shows the average marginal effects using the nested model, so that each
cell must be read as the marginal change of the variable that appears in the row
on the average probability that the workers belong to the regime that appears
in the column. Notice that the sum of changes in probabilities is one for each
variable whose modification is simulated.
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Table 5: Average marginal effects using the nested model
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The first simulation is a change of one unit in the pension wealth variable,
that is, a change of 1000 monetary units of June 2004 in the present value
of the lifetime pensions received from 65 years old on13. An increase of 1000
monetary units of pension wealth under the option of not being affiliated (the
reader may think, for example, in a non-contributory pension for the elderly)
would increase the average probability of not being affiliated to any pension
system (0.00026) and would simultaneously decrease the average probability of
being affiliated to the pay-as-you-go system (-0.00007) as to the funded system
(-0.000018)14. An increase in pension wealth in the pay-as-you-go system (for
example, by a change in the legal formula) would decrease the probability of
being affiliated to the funded system (0.00001). An increase in pension wealth
in the funded system (for example, by a higher return on pension funds) would
decrease the probability of not being affiliated to any pension system (-0.00018),
would marginally increase the probability of being affiliated to the pay-as-you-
go system (0.00001) and would increase the probability of being affiliated to the
funded system (0.00018).
The second simulation is a change of one unit on the pension cost, that is,
a change of 1000 monetary units of June 2004 in the present value of the con-
tributions realized from the period of observation to the retirement year15. An
increase of 1000 monetary units of the pay-as-you-go pension cost (for example,
by a decrease in the contribution rate) would increase the probability of not
being covered by any system (0.00146), would decrease the probability of being
affiliated to the funded system (-0.00135) and also would marginally decrease
the probability of being affiliated to the funded system (-0.00012). An increase
in the funded pension cost (for example, by increasing the commission of the
pension funds administrators) would increase the probability of not being affil-
iated to any pension system (0.00370), would decrease the probability of being
affiliated to the funded system (-0.00012) and would decrease the probability of
being affiliated to the funded system (-0.00358).
The analysis of marginal effects shows three additional results. First, measures
implemented on the funded system more efficiently increase social protection
against old age than measures applied on the pay-as-you-go. Notice that an
increase on funded pension wealth is almost three times more effective rising af-
filiation (0.00018) than a similar increase on the pay-as-you-go (0.00007); also,
a decrease in funded pension cost is almost three times more effective rising
membership (0.00358) to any pension system than a similar decrease on the
pay-as-you-go (0.00135). Second, the average probability of affiliation is more
sensitive to changes on pension cost than to changes in pension wealth in all cases
(for example in the case of not affiliation, 0.00026 is less than 0.00516). This is
13Consider for instance that, for a 40 years old worker, 1000 monetary units of pension
wealth equal to a lifetime pension of S/.12
14Note that the sum of these changes on probabilities is one.
15For example, in the case of the worker of 40 years old, 1000 monetary units of pension
cost equal to 4.65 monetary units less of monthly contribution
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probably related to an intertemporal myopia that would make the perception of
an increase in future pension more diffuse than a decline in contributions. Third,
econometric evidence shows that the pay-as-you-go and the funded system do
not compete with each other for members because, for instance, an increase in
pension wealth on one system does not decrease membership to the other sys-
tem, but slightly increases it. This is consistent with the utilization of a nested
model.
7.2 Contribution model
7.2.1 Descriptive statistics
This section presents descriptive statistics for three different groups: contrib-
utors to the pay-as-you-go system, contributors to the funded system and not
contributors to any system. To the purposes of this paper, a worker is consid-
ered contributor if he reports having paid his last contribution in the month
prior to the implementation of the survey.
Figure 7 shows how the participation of the three identified groups evolves
during the period of analysis. The left panel shows that, although there was a
positive evolution in both the pay-as-you-go and the funded system, the coverage
problem is still serious. Only 25% of workers contributed in 2009, representing
59% of the affiliated workers. Moreover, the right panel shows that the partic-
ipation of the contributors in the total of affiliates has decreased in the case of
the funded system.
Figure 7: Contributors evolution
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7.2.2 Econometric results
Table 6 shows the results of the contribution model. The columns show again
the estimates according to the multinomial logit model, conditional logit model,
conditional logit model with fixed effects and nested model. The interpretation
is again made on the results of the nested model.
The coefficients of pension wealth and pension cost have different results. Pen-
sion wealth has no significant coefficient, which means it does not affect the
probability of contributing. Pension cost, as happened in the affiliation model,
has a significant and negative coefficient. This means that, if this variable in-
creases for any of the three alternatives considered, then workers contribute less
in that alternative.
The coefficients of all variables associated to the contracting firm are highly
significant in both categories. This emphasizes that, beyond the design of the
pension systems, the labor market has an important role in contribution.
In sum, the empirical analysis shows that contributions do not depend on the
benefits offered by pension systems, probably because of intertemporal myopia.
However, contributions do depend on the costs they impose on workers.
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Table 6: Contribution model
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7.2.3 Average marginal effects
Table 7 presents marginal effects calculated from the nested model. As opposed
to the affiliation model, pension wealth has an almost null effect on contribu-
tion. Pension cost does have an effect on contribution, but it is smaller than its
effect on affiliation.
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By contrast, the relevance of the variables associated to the contracting firm
remains and in some cases increases. The importance of the labor situation
(wage worker /self-employed), for example, is greater in the contribution model
(-0.25011) than in the affiliation model (-0.15215). Hence, a marginal increase in
the participation of the wage workers on the total would favor a greater contri-
bution to the pension program. This is because the employer of a wage worker
is legally forced to withhold pension contribution from his wage and pay it to
the pension program, while this responsibility relies on the worker in the case
of self-employed.
Table 7: Marginal effects using the nested model
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8 Conclusions
This paper, on the basis of an ARUM micro-founded model, empirically analy-
ses the subscription and the contribution of the Peruvian workers to the pension
program, taking advantage of the almost unique coexistence between a pay-as-
you-go and a funded system. The estimated model is a nested whose first stage
determines if a worker is affiliated to a pension system or not, and whose sec-
ond stage involves choosing between the pay-as-you-go and the funded system.
In order to have variables that change over alternatives, the paper constructs
pension wealth and pension cost.
The nested model confirms that pension wealth has a significant positive impact
on affiliation, while pension cost has a significant negative impact. The marginal
effects reveal that a marginal change on benefits has less impact on affiliation
than a marginal change on costs, which is consistent with an intertemporal my-
opia; also, marginal effects reveal that a marginal change on the funded system
has a higher impact than a marginal change on the pay-as-you-go system, which
reveals different behaviors in each system.
This paper carries important implications for pension policies as it provides
a tool to estimate the impact of a number of policy measures on coverage. To
illuestrate how, appendix C discusses the non contributory pension scheme re-
cently launched by the Peruvian President Ollanta Humala16. The program
"Pension 65", as branded by Humala, will provide 125 Peruvian monetary units
(about US$46) to older people over 65 years who live in poverty. A simple ap-
plication of the estimated marginal effects allows predicting that "Pension 65"
would cause approximately 400 urban workers to become informal, from which
30% would come from the pay-as-you-go and 70% from the funded system.
In general terms, the marginal effects are useful to predict the impact of several
policies including subsidies on pension contributions of young workers, deduc-
tion of pension contributions from income tax, non contributory pension schemes
and subsidies on hiring. Marginal effects are a tool to estimate the number of
workers that migrate from informality to the pay-as-you-go or to the funded
system, or that leave the pension systems to become informal. It is also useful
to estimate the number of workers that would start or stop contributing to the
pension system. An early Spanish version of this paper (Carpio 2009) presents
preliminary estimates of the impact of other policy measures using a similar
strategy. A line of future research is adapting this general framework to specific
proposals in order to obtain more accurate estimations.
16Created by Supreme Decree N◦ 081-2011-PCM.
36
Appendices
A Legal framework for calculation of pensions
This appendix explains how pensions are computed within the pay-as-you-go
and the funded system.
A.1 Pay-as-you-go pension
The pay-as-you-go system requires, in general terms, a minimum of 20 years of
contributions to be eligible for benefits. Pensions are set using the legal formula
that corresponds. Previously to 2002, the pension was calculated as the 50% of
a "reference wage" plus an extra of 4% for each additional year of contribution
to the minimum required (20 years). This reference wage was established as the
income average of the last five years for those individuals with 20 to 24 years of
contribution, the income average of the last four years for those individuals with
25 to 29 years of contribution, and the income average of the last three years
for those individuals with more than 30 years of contribution. The following
equation shows the formula explained above:
Ppayg = 0.5 ∗ rw + 0.04 ∗ rw ∗ (q − 20) if q ≥ 20
= 0 if q < 20
where rw is the reference wage and q is the number of years of contribution.
Legal norms issued in 200217 established a new condition for individuals younger
than 55 years old at the date of publication. On one hand, reference wage be-
came equal to the average income of the last five years, independently of the
number of years of contribution. On the other hand, formulas were introduced
differentiated according to age at the time of publication.
Ppayg = 0.30 ∗ rw′ + 0.02 ∗ rw′ ∗ (q − 20) if q ≥ 20 and age2002 < 30
= 0.35 ∗ rw′ + 0.02 ∗ rw′ ∗ (q − 20) if q ≥ 20 and age2002 ∈ [30, 40)
= 0.40 ∗ rw′ + 0.02 ∗ rw′ ∗ (q − 20) if q ≥ 20 and age2002 ∈ [40, 50)
= 0.45 ∗ rw′ + 0.02 ∗ rw′ ∗ (q − 20) if q ≥ 20 and age2002 ∈ [50, 55)
= 0 if q < 20
17Law N◦ 27617 and Supreme Decree N◦099-202-EF.
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where rw′ is the reference wage for individuals younger than The computation
of pensions in the pay-as-you-go system includes minimum and maximum lim-
its, which generate redistribution within this regimen. The legal framework in
force18 establishes that the maximum pension is equal to 857 Peruvian mon-
etary units (about US$ 246,41), while the minimum pension is equal to 415
Peruvian monetary units (about US$119,32), which applies only if the time of
contribution is more than twenty years19.
A.2 Funded pension
Pensions in the funded system are calculated as a direct function of the accumu-
lated resources in the Individual Capitalization Account (ICA) during working
life. As opposed to the pay-as-you-go, the funded system does not require a
minimum number of contributions. The following formula calculates the ex-
pected value of the ICA at the age of retirement, which is 65 years regardless
of the gender:
ICA =
(
T∑
t=t0
at ∗ et
vt
)
∗ vT (3)
Where at is the rate of contribution, et is the annual wage and vt is the pension
fund price per share. Additionally, t0 is the period of affiliation to the funded
system and T is the period of retirement. Thus, the final level of the ICA is the
total number of periodically purchased fund shares, multiplied by the pension
fund price per share at the period of retirement.
The funded system temporarily includes a recognition bond, a governmental
transfer given in recognition for the contributions made to the pay-as-you-go
system. Individuals switching from the pay-as-you-go to the funded system are
entitled to these recognition bonds if they have made a minimum number of past
contributions. The face value of the bonds is given by the following formula:
B = 0.1831 ∗ rw′′ ∗m (4)
where rw′′ is the reference wage for the calculation of the recognition bond,
calculated as the average of the wages of the last year, and m is the number of
months of contributions in the pay-as-you-go system. The value of a recogni-
tion bond has an upper limit equal to 60.000 Peruvian monetary units (about
US$17.251,30) of December of 1992, which is updated periodically with a con-
sumer price index.
18Decree of Urgency N◦105-2001 and Supreme Decree N◦028-2002-EF.
19The pay-as-you-go system includes an early retirement pension. The amount of the pen-
sion is reduced 4% for each year advance respect to the 65 years.
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Finally, the pension is computed as a direct function of the sum of the ICA
and the recognition bond:
Pfunded =
ICA+B
URC
(5)
where URC is the unit required capital, i.e., the amount of money necessary to
deliver one monetary unit as a life-time pension. The table of this URC, which
depends on age and gender of the individual, is established in the regulatory
framework and meets actuarial computations.
B. Estimation of pension variables
This appendix explains the construction of the explanatory variables used in
the analysis.
B.1 Income profile and occupation probability estimation
The calculation of pension wealth and cost for each worker requires not only
the current wage, but the entire income profile, which is not available in the
surveys. While one alternative is assuming that the reported wage does not
change over time, this paper simulates earning histories by taking the reported
wage of each worker as one point of his income profile and then applying a set
of growth rates to this wage backwards and forwards20
The growth rates’ sets are computed from estimated group-income profiles,
whose computation requires a number of steps. First, the available data is used
to estimate a Mincer’s earnings equation of human capital (1958, 1974) with
selection bias correction by employment status21. Specifically, the logarithm
of income from the main occupation is regressed on years of education, years
of occupational experience (equal to current age minus age at the final year of
education) and a number of controls. Second, groups are defined as all possible
combinations of the explanatory variables different from years of occupational
experience (i.e. years of education and other controls). Third, for each defined
group, the estimated equation is use to obtain the predicted logarithm of income
that correspond to simulated years of occupational experience. Finally, every
group-income profile allows computing one set of growth rates. Hence, every
worker will receive the growth rate set that corresponds to the group he belongs
20Mincer and Ofek (1982), Blundell, Meghir and Smith (2002), Banks, Emmerson and
Tetlow (2005), Quintanilla (2008) and Carpio (2008) present alternative methodologies for
the estimation of earning profiles and pension wealth.
21Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2003) present a report on the current state of Mincer’s
equation.
39
to.
The Mincer’s equation used to estimate group-income profiles includes the occu-
pational experience variable alone, to the square and interacted with dummies
for education level. The square is included to recover a plausible non linear
effect. The interactions are included because a year of occupational experience
has different effects on income regarding the educational level of the worker.
This procedure is consistent with Murphy and Welch (1992), who reported dif-
ferences in income profiles for different educational levels in the United States.
The results of the Mincer’s regression are presented by Table 822. The first
column presents the outcome equation. Notice that the returns to occupational
experience do depend on the educational attainment as five from the eight con-
sidered interactions are statistically significant. The control variables are also
highly significant. The second column shows the selection equation. Note that
almost all the explanatory variables are significant, including marital status and
its interaction with gender. The opposite signs of these two variables reveal that
being married increases the probability of working for males, but decreases it
for females.
22The results are in line with Yamada (2007) and Calónico and Ñopo (2008), who have
conducted other applications of Mincer’s equation to Peru.
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Table 8: Mincer’s equation for the estimation of income profiles
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The previous regression is the main input to construct the group-income pro-
files. First, groups are defined as every possible combination of the control
variables (for instance, a group is composed by single males from Lima with
primary education, whose survey was applied in 2005). Second, for each group,
the predicted logarithm of income is estimated by considering different levels of
occupational experience23. Third, the predicted income is obtained by taking
antilogarithm to the previous estimations. Once the group-income profiles are
available, the growth rates’ sets are computed for each group.
The income profiles are then computed by taking the reported wage of each
worker as a point of the income profile and using the growth rates’ sets corre-
sponding to his group. Each profile is delimited from the first year in the labor
market (six plus years of schooling) to the retirement age. Figure 8 illustrates
the construction of the income profiles for four specific individuals that belong
to three different groups. The methodology allows not resigning to the variabil-
ity provided by the income variable.
Figure 8: Reported wages and constructed income profiles
The calculation of pension wealth also requires profiles of the probability of
working. The selection equation of the Mincer’s model allows obtaining group-
probability of working profiles. First, groups are defined as all possible com-
binations of the explanatory variables different from occupational experience.
Second, for each group, the predicted probability is obtained by simulating
23Notice that the Mills ratio also changes with occupational experience, which has been
taken into account
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different years of occupational experience. Finally, every worker receives the
probability of working profile that corresponds to his group.
In short, each individual of the four surveys receives an income profile, denoted
{ei} and a profile of the probability of being occupied, denoted {pi}.
B.2 Pay-as-you-go pension
Section 2 explained that a worker must contribute for a minimum number of
years to be eligible for pay-as-you-go pension and that this pension is calculated
by applying a legal formula. This section explains how this regulatory frame-
work was applied to the individuals of the survey.
In order to evaluate whether a worker will complete the minimum number of
contribution years, the number of years from the beginning of his working life
(equal to six plus his years of education) to the legal retirement age (equal
to 65) is computed. Since the worker may experience unemployment for some
years, the previous number of years is multiplied by the average probability of
working, obtained from series {pi}. This product, the expected number of years
of employment, is used to check whether the worker fulfill the required years of
contribution.
Pay-as-you-go pension for eligible workers is calculated by applying the legal
formula in force during the year of observation. The legal formula requires a
reference wage, which is calculated taking the last wages from the income pro-
files {ei}. Once the pension is calculated, it is restricted to the minimum and
maximum in force.
B.3 Funded pension
Section 2 also explained that the funded pension is computed as a direct func-
tion of the contributed resources plus the return obtained by pension funds
administrators. Moreover, a Recognition Bond is added if a worker started to
work before the pension reform of 1993 and if he fulfills a minimum number of
contribution years. This section explains how funded pensions are estimated for
the individuals of the survey.
Two methods are applied depending on the first year of working, which is as-
sumed to be six plus the years of education of each individual. For those that
have started to work after the reform of 1993, the funded pension depends only
on the resources accumulated in the ICA. For those that have started to work
before the reform, the estimated funded pension assumes that they have con-
tributed to the pay-as-you-go system until 1993 and that they have switched to
the funded system in that year. Hence, the funded pension depends on the ICA
and, if the worker is eligible, also on the Recognition Bond.
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The ICA is calculated by applying equation 3 to the income profile {ei} in
the equation 3, which requires assuming a rate of contribution and a rate of
growth in share value. The contribution rate, consistently with the regulatory
framework, is assumed 10% for contributions from 1993 to 1996, 8% for contri-
butions from 1997 to 2005 and 10% for contributions from 2006 onwards. The
rate of growth in share vale is assumed to be risk-less and equal to 6
Recognition Bond is estimated in two stages. First, to evaluate whether a
worker fulfills the minimum number of contribution years, the number of years
between the beginning of working life and 1992 (last year of recognition accord-
ing to the law) is multiplied by the average probability of working in the same
period (computed from {pi}). Second, the bond is computed for eligible work-
ers by using equation 4, which requires estimating reference wage from income
profiles ei and accounting for the upper limit of S/.60000 monetary units of
December 1992.
The monthly pension of the individual is directly estimated using equation 5,
that is, as the sum of the resources of the ICA and the Recognition Bond, di-
vided by the corresponding URC. According to the legal table, the URC is 168
for 65 years-old men and 168 for 65 years-old women.
B.4 Pension wealth and pension cost
Pension wealth, both in the pay-as-you-go and the funded system, is estimated
as the present value of pensions that each individual would receive from retire-
ment until decease. Operatively, pension wealth in the funded systems is simply
the sum of the ICA resources and the Recognition Bond, discounted from the
retirement year to the year of observation. Similarly, pension wealth in the pay-
as-you-go is the product of the calculated pension and the URC, discounted
from the retirement year to the year of observation. Finally, pension wealth is
equal to zero in the scenario of not being affiliated to any pension system.
Pension cost in the pay-as-you-go system is calculated as the present value
of contributions from the year of observation to the retirement year. Hence, a
contribution rate of 13% is applied to the income profile ei. Pension cost in the
funded system is calculated similarly, but using the contribution rate of 10%
plus the average commission and premium applied by the AFP in the period of
observation. The total rate increases is 11.15% , 12.78% , 12.69% , 12.67% and
12.82% in the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively.
C. "Pension 65"
The Peruvian President Ollanta Humala recently launched the non contribu-
tory pension scheme "Pension 65"24. This program will provide 125 Peruvian
24Created by Supreme Decree N◦ 081-2011-PCM.
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monetary units (about US$46) to older people over 65 years who live in poverty.
This program may affect the incentives to affiliate to pension systems of workers
under 65 years old who live in poverty, as they can expect to receive a pension
in the future without contributing. This appendix estimates how many urban
workers living in poverty may have incentives to leave formality.
Table 9: Effect of the non contributory pension scheme "Pension 65"
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